As Peter Novick has detailed in his account of the American historical profession, by the turn of the century historians in the United States had begun their quest for scientific status, which for most seemed to preclude the leakage of moral opinion into the objective recovery of the past-at least in an overt way. Novick also catalogues the stumbling failures of this noble dream, when political partisanship and rampant nationalism sullied the ideal. 4 Historians in our own time continue to be wary of rendering explicit moral pronouncements, thinking it a derogation of their obligations. On occasion, some historians have been moved to embrace the opposite attitude, especially when considering the horrendous events of the twentieth century-the holocaust, for instance.
It would seem inhumane to describe such events in morally neutral terms. Yet even about events of this kind, most historians assume that any moral judgments ought to be delivered as obiter dicta, not really part of the objective account of these events. Lea thought a clean depiction of despicable individuals and actions would naturally provoke readers into making their own moral judgments about the past, without the historian coercing their opinions.
This attitude of studied neutrality has become codified in the commandments handed down by the National Center for History in the Schools, whose committee has recently proclaimed: "Teachers should not use historical events to hammer home their own favorite moral lesson."
5 Presumably this goes as well for the historian teacher, whose texts the students study. And one might suppose that when the narrative describes episodes in the history of science occasion for intrusive moral assessment would be quite limited.
I believe that these demands that historians disavow moral assessment neglect a crucial aspect of the writing of history, whether it be political history or history of science: that the deep grammar of narrative history requires that moral judgments be rendered. And that's the thesis I will argue in this essay, namely, that all historical narratives must make moral assessments. I will be especially concerned with an assessment that might be called that of "historical responsibility."
The role of moral judgment about past historical characters has, despite causal assumption to the contrary, been brought to eruptive boil recently in one area of history of biology-that of nineteenth and early twentieth century evolutionary thought in Germany. The individual about whom considerable historical and moral controversy swirls is Ernst Haeckel ( fig. 1 ). I'll say more about Haeckel in a moment. He offers a test case for my thesis. Now I'll simply point out that Haeckel, more than any other individual, was responsible for the warfare that broke out in the second half of the nineteenth century between evolutionary theorists and religiously minded thinkers, a warfare that continues unabated in the contemporary cultural struggle between advocates of Intelligent Design and those defending real biological science. My motivation for considering the moral structure of narratives is encapsulated in the main title of a book that was published not long ago: From Darwin to Hitler. 6 The 3 6 Richard Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). pivotal character in this historical descent, according to the author, is Ernst Haeckel. He and Darwin are implicitly charged with historical responsibility for acts that occurred after they themselves died. I don't think judgments of this kind, those attributing moral responsibility across decades, are unwarranted in principle. The warrant lies in the grammar of historical narrative. Whether this particular condemnation of Darwin and Haeckel is appropriate remains quite another matter.
The Temporal and Causal Grammar of Narrative History
Let me focus, for a moment, on two features narrative history as a prelude to my argument and as an illustration of what I mean by the grammar of narrative. This concerns the ways time and causality are represented in narrative histories. Each seeps into narratives in at least four different ways.
7 Let me first consider, quite briefly, the temporal dimensions of narrative.
Initially, we might distinguish what might be called the time of events.
Embedded in the deep structure of narrative is the time during which events occur; that sort of time flows equitably on into the future, with each unit having equal duration.
Narratives project events as occurring in a Newtonian time. This kind of time allows the historian to place events in a chronology, to compare the duration of events, and to locate them in respect to one another as antecedent, simultaneous, or successive.
But the structuring of these events in a narrative also exhibits what might be called narrative time, and this is a different sort of temporal modality. Consider, for instance, Harold Pinter's play "Betrayal." The first scene is set temporally toward the end of the Newtonian sequence dramatized, with the next scene going in the right direction, occurring a few days later. But the third scene falls back to two years before, and the fourth a year before that, with subsequent scenes taking us back finally to a period six years before the final days with which the play begins. The audience,
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I have discussed the temporal and causal structure of narrative history in my "The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology," History and Evolution, eds. Matthew Nitecki and Doris Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 19-53. however, never loses its temporal bearings or believes that time staggers along, weaving back and forth like an undergraduate leaving the local college pub.
The historian might structure his or her narrative in a roughly comparable way, when one aspect of the history is related, but then the historian returns to an earlier time to follow out another thread of the story. Or the historian might have the narrative jump into the future to highlight the significance of some antecedent event. Again, when done with modest dexterity, the reader is never confused about the Newtonian flow of events.
The time of narration is a less familiar device by which historians restructure real time as well as narrative time. One of the several modes by which historians construct this kind of time is through contraction and expansion of sentence duration.
Let me illustrate what I mean by reference to a history with which most readers will be familiar-Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War. At the beginning of his history, Thucydides-a founder, along with Herodotus, of the genre of narrative history-Thucydides expends a few paragraphs on events occurring in the earliest period of Cretan hegemony through the time of the Trojan War to just before the outbreak of the war between the two great powers of ancient Greece, Athens and Sparta. The period he so economically describes in a few paragraphs extends, in Newtonian time, for about two thousand years. But Thucydides then devotes several hundred pages to the relatively brief twenty-year period of the War, at least that part of the War he recorded. Sentence duration is an indication of the importance the historian places on the events referred to. Sentence expansion or contraction, however, may have other sustaining causes.
Simply the pacing or rhythm of the historian's prose might be one. The great French scientist and historian Bernard de Fontenelle said that if the cadences of his sentences demanded it, the Thirty Years War would have turned out differently. Some historians will linger over an episode, not because it fills in a sequence vital to the tale, but because the characters involved are intrinsically interesting. Maybe some humorous event is inserted in the story simply to keep the reader turning the pages. In histories, centuries may be contracted into the space of a sentence, while moments may be expanded through dozens of paragraphs.
A fourth temporal dimension of narrative is the time of narrative construction. This is a temporal feature especially relevant to considerations of the moral structure of histories. A narrative will be temporally layered by reason of its construction, displaying, as it were, both temporal depth and a temporal horizon. The temporal horizon is more pertinent for my concerns, so let me speak of that. Thucydides wrote the first part of his history toward the end of the war that he described, when the awful later events allowed him to pick out those earlier, antecedent events of explanatory relevance-earlier events that would be epistemologically tinged with Athenian folly yet to come. Only the benefits of hindsight, for example, could have allowed him to put into the mouth of the Spartan messenger Melesipus, who was sent on a last desperate peace mission just before the first engagement of the war-to put into the mouth of this messenger the prophetic regret: "This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes to Hellas." By the horizontal ordering of time, the historian can describe events in ways that the actors participating in the events could not: Melesipus's prophecy was possible only because Thucydides had already lived through it. This temporal perspective is crucial for the historian. Only from the vantage in the future, can the historian pick out from an infinity of antecedent events just those deemed necessary for the explanation of the consequent events of interest.
Different causal structures of narratives correspond to their temporal modalities.
I won't detail all of their aspects, but let me quickly rehearse their dominate modes. The most fundamental causal feature of narratives is the causality of events. This is simply the causality ascribed to events about which the historian writes. Typically the historian will arrange events so as to indicate their causal sequence, a sequence in which the main antecedent causes are indicated so as to explain subsequent events, ultimately the central events which the history was designed to explain.
Events in a narrative, however, display a different causal grammar from events in nature. We may thus speak of the causality of narrated events. When in 433 B.C., the Athenians of Thucydides' history interfered in an internal affair of Corinth, a Spartan ally, they couldn't have predicted that war would result-though they might have suspected; they certainly couldn't have predicted their ignominious defeat in the Sicilian campaign twenty years later. From inside of the scene that Thucydides has set, the future appears open; all things are possible, or at least unforeseeable. Yet each of Thucydides's scenes moves inevitably and inexorably to that climax, namely to the destruction of the fleet at Syracuse, the central event of his history. The historian, by reason of his or her temporal horizon, arranges antecedent events to make their outcome, the central event of interest, something the reader, can expect-something, in the ideal case, that would be regarded as inevitable given the antecedent events, all the while keeping his actors in the dark until the last minute. This is a view about the grammar of narration that some historians would not share. Some try assiduously to avoid surface terms redolent of causality in their narratives. But I think this is to be unaware of the deeper grammar of narrative. The antecedent events are chosen by the historian to make, as far as he or she is able, the consequent events a causal inevitability. That's what it is to explain events historically.
To the degree this kind of causal structure is missing, to that degree the history will fail to explain how it is that the subsequent events of interests occurred or took the shape they did. Without a tight causal grammar the narrative will loosen to mere chronicle. This grammatical feature of narrative has bearing on any moral characterization of the actions of the individuals about whom the historian writes. And this in two ways.
First, we do think that when we morally evaluate an action, we assume the individual could have chosen otherwise. There will thus be a tension between the actors represented as regarding the future as open, as full of possibilities, and the historian's knowledge that the future of the actors is closed. They did what they did because of the narrated events, events carrying those individuals to their appointed destiny.
The second way the causality of narrated events bears on moral assessment has to do with the construction of the sequence of events and their causal connections. The historian will also be making a moral evaluation of the actions of characters-implicitly at least-and will arrange that sequence in which the character's actions are placed so as either morally to indict the individual, or morally to exculpate the individual, or, what is more frequently the case, to locate the individual's action in a morally neutral ground.
I'll say more about this feature of the grammar of narrative in a moment.
A third causal modality deployed by historians may be called the causality of narration. This aspect of causality has several features, but I will mention only one:
this is the location in a narrative of various scenes. So, for example, Thucydides will place one scene before another to indicate what he presumes is an important condition or cause for a subsequent scene, even though the scenes may be at some real temporal distance. A speech made to motivate an action might be placed immediately before the scene in which the action is described, even though the two events may be guide-a guide that may alter, of course, during the research-the historian could not even start to lay out those antecedent causes that he or she will finally regard as the explanation for the conclusion of the historical sequence.
A related feature of the causality of narrative construction concerns the motives guiding the historian, of which there may be several. The proclaimed and standard motivation of the great nineteenth century historian Leopold von Ranke was to describe an event "wie es eigentlich gewesen," how it actually was; and, insofar as how it was becomes in specific instances the central event that needs explanation, that event-the final cause-becomes the motive for constructing the history. Ranke's general standard must be that of every historian. Good historians will want to weigh purported causes of events and emphasize the most important, while reducing narrative time spent on the less important. Yet often other motivations, perhaps hardly conscious even to the historian, may give structure to his or her work. In his suspicious little book What is History?, E. H. Carr urged that "when we take up a work of history, our first concern should be not with the facts which it contains but with the historian who wrote it."
8 If the reader knows in advance that the historian is of a certain doctrinal persuasion, then a judicious skepticism may well be in order. After all, a historian may select events that have real but minor causal connections with central events of concern, while ignoring even more important antecedent causes. The history would then have a certain
verisimilitude, yet be a changeling. Motivations of authors are often revealed by the moral grammar of narratives, another structural feature that lies at the syntactic depths of historical accounts.
The Moral Grammar of Narrative History
I'm going to now turn specifically to the features of the moral grammar of histories, and then illustrate some of the ways that structure characterizes Ernst
Haeckel's story. If narratives have these grammatical structures, then it would be well for historians to be reflectively conscious of this and to formulate their reconstructions in light of a set of principles that I believe should be operative. And in a moment I'll suggest what those principles ought to be by which we morally judge the behavior of individuals who lived in the past and by which we assess their culpability for the future actions of others.
But Let me first pose the question: Do historians make normative judgments in their histories and should they? I will argue that not only should they, they must by reason of narrative grammar. At one level, it's obvious historians, of necessity, do make normative judgments. Historical narratives are constructed on the basis of evidencewritten documents-letters, diaries, published works-also artifacts, such as archeological findings-and high tech instruments, such as DNA analysis, and sometimes oral interviews. And historians attribute modes of behavior to actors on the basis of inference from evidence and in recognition of certain standards. Even when doing something apparently as innocuous as selecting a verb to characterize a proposition attributed to an actor, the historian must employ a norm or standard. For example, Thucydides could have had Melesipus think that disaster was in the offing, believe that disaster was in the offing, be convinced that disaster was in the offing, suspect that disaster was in the offing, assume that disaster was in the offing, or
prophesy that disaster was in the offing. Whatever verb the historian selects, he or she will do so because the actor's behavior, as suggested by the evidence, has met a certain standard for such and such modal description-say, being in a state of firm conviction as opposed to vague supposition. All descriptions require measurement against standards or norms-which is not to say that in a given instance, the standard and consequent description would be the most appropriate. The better the historian, the more appropriate the norms employed in rendering descriptions.
Virtually all of the historian's choices of descriptive terms must be normative in this sense. But must some of these norms also be moral norms? I believe they must.
The argument is fairly straightforward-at least as straightforward as arguments of this sort ever get. for his elevation to emperor, even while Constantius was still on the throne. Julian protested he couldn't take the diadem, even as he reluctantly and sadly accepted it.
Gibbon writes:
The grief of Julian could proceed only from his innocence; but his innocence must appear extremely doubtful in the eyes of those who have learned to suspect the motives and the professions of princes. His lively and active mind was susceptible of the various impressions of hope and fear, of gratitude and revenge, of duty and of ambition, of the love of fame and of the fear of reproach.
But it is impossible for us to ascertain the principles of action which might escape the observation, while they guided, or rather impelled, the steps of Julian himself. . . He solemnly declares, in the presence of Jupiter, of the Sun, of
Mars, of Minerva, and of all the other deities, that till the close of the evening which preceded his elevation he was utterly ignorant of the designs of the soldiers; and it may seem ungenerous to distrust the honour of a hero, and the truth of a philosopher. Yet the superstitious confidence that Constantius was the enemy, and that he himself was the favourite, of the gods, might prompt him to desire, to solicit, and even to hasten the auspicious moment of his reign, which was predestined to restore the ancient religion of mankind.
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In the cascade of rhetorical devices at play-zeugma, antithesis, irony-Gibbon explicitly refuses to attribute morally demeaning motives to Julian, and, of course, at the same time implicitly does precisely that. There is another element of judgment that
Gibbon evinces here, which is also an important feature of the moral grammar of historical narrative.
Narratives explain action by allowing us to understand character, in this case case of this and to consider the principles that, I believe, should be operative in making moral judgments of historical figures. This is in the instance of Ernst Haeckel.
Ernst Haeckel, Darwin's Champion in Germany
Haeckel was Darwin's great champion of evolutionary theory in Germany; he was a principal in the theory's introduction there and a forceful defender of it from the mid 1860s until 1919 when he died. 10 Haeckel's work on evolution reached far beyond the borders of the German lands. His popular accounts of evolutionary theory were translated into all the known and unknown languages-at least unknown to the Westincluding Armenian, Chinese, Hebrew, Sanskrit, and Esperanto. More people learned of evolutionary theory through Haeckel's voluminous writings during this period than from any other source, including Darwin's own work.
Haeckel achieved many popular successes, and, as well, produced more than twenty large, technical monographs on various aspects of systematic biology and evolutionary theory. In these works he described many hitherto unknown species, He thought of giving up biology for the life of a Bohemian, spending his time in painting and poetizing with other German expatriates on the island of Ischia. But he felt that he had to accomplish something in biology, so that he could become a professor and marry the woman he had fallen deeply in love with-his love letters sent back to his fiancée in Berlin are something delicious to read. He finally hit upon a topic: a systematic description of a little known creature that populated the seas, the one-celled protist called a radiolarian ( fig. 3) . It was while writing his habilitation on these creatures in 1861 that he happened to read Darwin's Origin of Species and became a convert.
Haeckel produced a magnificent two-volume tome on the radiolaria, which he himself illustrated with extraordinary artistic and scientific acumen. 11 Later in the century, his In the years following this upheaval,
Haeckel became a zealous missionary for new faith, and his own volatile and combative personality made him a crusader whose demeanor was in striking contrast to that of the modest and retiring English master whom he has continued to irritate historians of smaller imagination. nce between the rationality of these latter and that of the intelligent historiography. For example, istorians will often credit, say, Copernicus, in the fifteenth century, with the courage to aic assumption and thus, by unshackling teleological feature of history. While this type of judgment derives from the moral to justify Haeckel's own doctrine. That is, only the best blood flowed through Haeckel's veins, and therefore we may trust his ideas.
The Moral Indictment of Haeckel
To make the favorable connection between Haeckel and Hitler, Brücher focused on a passage from Haeckel's Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, that reads: "The difference in rationality between a Goethe, a Kant, a Lamarck, a Darwin and that of the lower natural men-a Veda, a Kaffer, an Australian and a Papuan is much greater than the graduated differe vertebrates, for instance, the higher apes." Brücher then cites a quite similar remark by
Hitler in his Nuremberg speech of 1933. 17 In this way he has made Haeckel historically responsible, at least in part, for Hitler's racial attitudes.
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The Judgment of 'Historical Responsibility'
Brücher's attribution of moral responsibility to Haeckel is of a type commonly found in history, though the structure of these kinds of judgments usually goes unnoticed, lying as it does in the deep grammar of h have broken through the rigidity of Ptolem men's minds, to have initiated the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This, too, is a moral appraisal of historical responsibility, though, needless to say, Copernicus himself never uttered: "I now intended to free men's minds and initiate the scientific revolution." Yet, historians do assign him credit for that, moral credit for giving successors the ability to think differently and productively. While responsibility assigned Darwin and Haeckel might be mitigated by a more realistic weighing of causal trajectories, some culpability might, nonetheless, remain.
Yet is there any consideration that might make us sever, not the causal chain-say, from Darwin's writing, to Haeckel's, to Brücher's, to memos of high ranking Nazis, and finally to Hitler's speeches-b and of course, Darwin, had been dead decades before the rise of the Nazis. And as Monty-Python might have put it, they're still dead.
Let me summarize at this juncture the different modal structures of moral judgment in historical narratives that I've tried to identify. First is the explicit appraisal of the historian, rendered when the historian overtly applies the language of moral elieve that the same general principles ought to serve as standards for our moral assessment to some decision or action taken by an historical figure. This is both rare and runs against the grain of the cooler sensibili excepted.
Second is the appraisal of contemporaries (or later individuals). Part of the historian's task will often be to describe the judgments made on an actor by his or her own associates or subsequent individuals. In the case of Haeckel, there were those who condemned him of malfeasance, as well as colleagues who defended him against the charge.
hardly decisive.
Third is the appraisal by causal connection. This occurs when the historian joins the decisions of an actor with consequential behavior of moral import. The behavior itself might be that of the actor or behavior displaced at some temporal remove from the actor's overt intentions-Hitler's actions, for example, as supposedly promoted by
Haeckel's concep causal trajectory moves from past to future, but the moral responsibility flows along the causal tracks from future back to past. And it is the guiding hand of the historianfueled by a complex of motives-that pushes this historical responsibility back along the causal rails to the past. And it's here that a minor causal relationship can be mistaken for a major moral relationship. I will, in just a moment, indicate how I believe the historian ought reflectively to modulate the flow of responsibility.
Finally, there is appraisal by aesthetic charge. This occurs when the historian through artful design evokes a feeling of positive or negative regard for the actor. In the treatment of Haeckel by Gould, Gasman, and Weikart, the needle of regard has swung to the decidedly negative end of the scale.
Principles of Moral Judgment
This brings me to the final part of my argument, namely the principles that ought to govern, in a reflective way, our moral judgments about historical figures, especially for actions that were at some temporal dis b es as serve for the assessments of our contemporaries, she attempt to do? What action did the actor e power of their practice. Their intention was to apply the best curative is character. Or did he merely intend to provide an illustration of the law for a assessments of historical figur including ourselves. But much will depend on how those principles get specified when judging historically remote individuals.
First, there is the supreme principle of evaluation: it might be the golden rule, the greatest happiness, altruism, or the categorical imperative. Likely in the cases I have in mind any of these presumptive first principles will yield a similar assessment of moral motives, since they express, I believe, the same moral core. Secondly, there is the intention of the actor: what did he or desire to execute, to be distinguished, of course, from mere accidental behavior? Third is the motive for acting, the ground for that intention to act in a certain fashion. The motive will determine moral valence. Finally, in assessing moral behavior, we must examine the beliefs of the individual actor and try to determine whether they were reasonable beliefs-and this is the special provenance of the historian. Let me give an example.
When the Hippocratic physicians, during the great Athenian plague that Thucydides so dramatically described-when those physicians purged and bled the afflicted, their treatment actually hastened the deaths of their patients. But we certainly don't think the physicians malign or malfeasant, since they had a reasonable belief in the curativ techniques. And their motive, we may presume, was altruistic, since they risked their own lives in caring for the sick. One should judge them, I believe, moral heroes, even though the consequence of their behavior was injury and even the death of their patients. In addition to carefully assessing intentions and motives, the historian must also consider the set of beliefs harbored by the actor. For example, was it reasonable for someone like Darwin or Haeckel to believe that evolutionary theory led to a hierarchy of species within a genus or races within a species? Or did they hold these ide reckless disregard for the truth. To assess reasonableness of belief in this instance, the historian would have to know what the scientific consensus happened to be in the second half of the nineteenth century. And in this case, a modestly diligent historian would discover that the community of evolutionary theorists-as well as other biologists-did understand the human races to stand in a hierarchy, just as did other animals that displayed a scale of traits. In the human case, the traits included those of is not only to unearth long interred intellectual structures but intelligence, moral character, and beauty. Nineteenth-century evolutionary theory implied that conclusion, and all of the available evidence supported it. We might recognize from our perspective certain social factors constraining the judgments of biologists; but it's safe to say they did not.
Then the historian can further ask, in this particular instance, what does categorizing peoples as branches of a racial hierarchy mean for the treatment of those so classified? This question does not allow for a universal answer, but will depend more particularly on the individual scientist.
acceding to belief in a racial hierarchy, but neglects to mention that Darwin did not think any action should be taken to reduce the welfare of those lower in the scale. Haeckel's own attitudes about how one should treat those lower in the hierarchy is less clear; but there is hardly room for moral condemnation, given the obscurity of his views about practical action.
Conclusion
It can only be a tendentious and dogmatically driven assessment that would condemn Darwin m considerable An historian can't write an extended account of the life of an individual without some measure of identification. If one is going to recover the past with anything like verisimilitude, one must, as R. G. Collingwood has maintained-one must relive the ideas of the past, which also to feel again the pulse of their vitality, to sense their urgency, to admire their originality, and thus to empathize with their authors. And yet one has to do all of this while retaining a reflective awareness of the moral structure in which actors conceived those ideas and perceived their import.
